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Abstract
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) deals with the representation and the study in
a multi-agent setting of knowledge and belief change. It can express in a uniform
way epistemic statements about:
(i) what is true about an initial situation
(ii) what is true about an event occurring in this situation
(iii) what is true about the resulting situation after the event has occurred.
We axiomatize within the DEL framework what we can infer about (iii) given (i)
and (ii). Given three formulas φ, φ′ and φ′′ describing respectively (i), (ii) and (iii),
we also show how to build a formula φ ⊗ φ′ which captures all the information
which can be inferred about (iii) from φ and φ′. We show how our results extend to
other modal logics than K. In our proofs and definitions, we resort to a large extent
to the normal form formulas for modal logic originally introduced by Kit Fine. In
a companion paper [Aucher, 2012], we axiomatize what we can infer about (ii)
given (i) and (iii), and what we can infer about (i) given (ii) and (iii), and show
how to build two formulas φ  φ′′ and φ′  φ′′ which capture respectively all the
information which can be inferred about (ii) from φ and φ′′, and all the information
which can be inferred about (i) from φ′ and φ′′.
1 Introduction
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) deals with the representation and the study in a
multi-agent setting of knowledge and belief change, and more generally of informa-
tion change [van Ditmarsch et al., 2007]. The core idea of DEL is to split the task of
representing the agents’ beliefs into three parts: first, one represents their beliefs about
an initial situation; second, one represents their beliefs about an event taking place in
this situation; third, one represents the way the agents update their beliefs about the
situation after (or during) the occurrence of the event. Consequently, within the logical
framework of DEL, one can express uniformly epistemic statements about:
(i) what is true about an initial situation,
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(ii) what is true about an event occurring in this situation,
(iii) what is true about the resulting situation after the event has occurred.
From a logical point of view, this trichotomy begs the following three questions (which
were already raised in [Kooi, 2007]). In these questions, φ, φ′ and φ′′ are three epis-
temic formulas describing respectively (i), (ii) and (iii).
Question 1:
1. Given (i) and (ii), what can we infer about (iii): φ, φ′ φ′′?
2. How can we build a single formula φ ⊗ φ′ which captures all the informa-
tion which can be inferred about (iii) from φ and φ′?
Question 2:
1. Given (i) and (iii), what can we infer about (ii): φ, φ′′ φ′?
2. How can we build a single formula φ  φ′′ which captures all the infor-
mation which can be inferred about (ii) from φ and φ′′?
Question 3:
1. Given (ii) and (iii), what can we infer about (i): φ′, φ′′ φ?
2. How can we build a single formula φ  φ′′ which captures all the infor-
mation which can be inferred about (i) from φ′ and φ′′?
Providing formal tools that answer these questions leads to applications in artificial
intelligence and theoretical computer science, and as it turns out, some of them have
already been addressed in DEL and other logical formalisms.1
Question 1: Progression. Answering the first question leads to the development of
tools that can be used by (artificial) agents to compute autonomously their rep-
resentation of situations as events occur or to reason about the effects of these
events. This question has been addressed in the situation calculus, where it is
related to the notion of progression [Reiter, 2001]. In the logics of programs,
our DEL-sequent φ, φ′ φ′′ correspond to the partial correctness specifications
{φ}pi{φ′′} of Hoare’s logic [Hoare, 1969] which read as “after every successful
execution of program pi starting from a state where precondition φ holds, post-
condition φ′′ holds in the final state”. Likewise, our formula φ⊗φ′ corresponds to
the strongest post-condition of Propositional Dynamic Logic [Pratt, 1976]. That
the product update of DEL is in fact the same as the strongest post-condition has
been elaborated on and proved in an algebraic setting in [Baltag et al., 2005]. A
sequent calculus is also provided in this algebraic setting.
1The question of determining the exact relationship of DEL with other logical formalims has recently
started to be investigated. The interested reader can consult [van Benthem, 2011, van Ditmarsch et al., 2009]
for its relationship with the situation calculus and [van Benthem et al., 2009a] for its relationship with epis-
temic temporal logic.
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Question 2: Epistemic planning. Answering the second question also leads to ap-
plications in artificial intelligence in the area of epistemic planning: (artificial)
agents often need to determine autonomously which actions they need to per-
form in order to achieve a given epistemic goal. This second question is also
related to the notion of explanation and has been dealt with in the event cal-
culus of [Shanahan, 1997] for instance, where it is shown that planning prob-
lems can be handled via abduction (using logic programming). In computer
science, this second question is also related to the synthesis problem raised by
Church in its full generality [Church, 1957]. He asked whether, given a de-
sired relation between a set of inputs and a set of outputs, we can construct a
function that produces the desired outputs from arbitrary inputs. This problem
has been declined as the problem of program synthesis: given a specification,
can we construct a program that is guaranteed to satisfy this specification? It
was extensively studied in the 1980s and 1990s for temporal logic specifica-
tions. The synthesis problem is more challenging when the input is incom-
plete [Kupferman & Vardi, 1999]. Open (reactive) environments can be a rea-
son of incompleteness of the input, and epistemic logic is a natural formalism
to resort to model such situations, as argued in [Halpern & Moses, 1990]. For
single-agent temporal epistemic logic, this synthesis problem has been solved in
[van der Meyden & Vardi, 1998]. However, this problem has not been addressed
so far within the DEL approach, although its methodology and formal setting
lend itself rather naturally to address it.
Question 3: Regression. Answering the third question is related to the notion of re-
gression introduced in the situation calculus [Reiter, 2001]. This technique is
used to determine whether a statement holds after a sequence of events (called
the projection problem) by reducing (regressing) this statement about the result-
ing situation to a statement about the initial situation. In DEL, regression corre-
sponds to the classical reduction method used to prove completeness of an ax-
iomatization: a formula with dynamic operator(s) is ‘reduced’ equivalently to a
formula without dynamic operator by pushing the dynamic operator through the
logical connectives, performing some kind of regression of the initial formula
with dynamic operator. In the companion paper [Aucher, 2012], our inductive
definition of the regression of φ′′ by φ′, i.e. φ′φ′′, is based on the reduction ax-
ioms of DEL [Baltag & Moss, 2004]. Note that in Propositional Dynamic Logic,
¬(φ ¬φ′′) also corresponds to the weakest precondition.
In this paper, we will answer the first question within the DEL framework. The
second and third questions are dealt with in a companion paper [Aucher, 2012]. In a
third paper [Aucher et al., 2011], we provide a tableau method to decide whether an
inference of one of the three kinds above holds and show that this decision problem is
NEXPTIME-complete. The tableau method is also implemented in LOTRECscheme.
From a conceptual perspective, axiomatizing the first inference relation φ, φ′ φ′′
leads to a natural characterization of the notion of (belief) update. This notion can
therefore be studied rigorously and systematically, as it has been done in the restricted
setting of a single agent in the theory of belief revision of [Alchourro´n et al., 1985]
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and the theory of belief update of [Katsuno & Mendelzon, 1992]. In particular, this
axiomatic/postulational approach permits a natural comparison, analysis and introduc-
tion of new revision and update operations. In DEL, [van Benthem, 2007] proposes
another approach to analyse updates. The idea is to apply the same technique used in
modal logic for modal frame correspondance to the study of the modal operator of up-
date. Dynamic axioms can characterize classes of operations on models in the way that
classical modal axioms characterize classes of frames. This approach is at the same
time less restrictive than ours, but also more abstract. Less restrictive in the sense that
the language used can combine within a single formula expressions dealing with (i),
(ii) and (iii) altogether, unlike our DEL-sequents where these expressions are clearly
separated. More abstract in the sense that what is really studied is the inference rela-
tion from (i) to (iii), the second item (ii) being somehow abstracted away. However, in
its current form, this approach cannot account explicitly for specific classes of updates
induced by classes of event models as the ones typically used in DEL, simply because
the language cannot refer to classes of event models.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our logical formalism
and show how one can naturally express epistemic statements about (i), (ii) and (iii)
within this framework. In Section 3, we introduce some mathematical objects needed in
the subsequent proofs, namely normal form formulas and the notion of refinement. We
also characterize this notion of refinement syntactically by means of our normal form
formulas. In Section 4, we provide two equivalent sequent calculi which axiomatize
the inference relation of Question 1) a), both for epistemic and ontic events. In Section
5, we propose a constructive definition of the formula φ ⊗ φ′ of Question 1) b). In
Section 6, we show how our results extend to other modal logics than K, and in Section
7 we give some examples of derivations of valid inferences in our calculi. We end the
paper in Section 8 by some concluding remarks.
2 Dynamic Epistemic Logic
Following the DEL methodology described above, we split the exposition of our logical
formalism into three subsections. In the rest of the paper, Agt is a finite set of agents
and Φ is a set of propositional letters called atomic facts.
2.1 Representation of the initial situation: L-model
A (pointed) L-model (M,w) represents how the actual world represented by w is per-
ceived by the agents. Atomic facts are used to state properties of this actual world.
Definition 1 (L-model). A L-model is a tuple M = (W,R,V) where W is a non-empty
set of possible worlds, R : Agt → 2W×W is a function assigning to each agent j ∈ Agt an
accessibility relation on W, and V : Φ→ 2W is a function called a valuation assigning
to each propositional letter of Φ a subset of W.
We write w ∈ M for w ∈ W, and (M,w) is called a pointed L-model. If w, v ∈ W,
we write wR jv for R( j)(w, v) and R j(w) for {v ∈ W | wR jv}. 
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Intuitively, in the definition above, v ∈ R j(w) means that in world w agent j consid-
ers world v as being possibly the world w.
Now, we define the epistemic language L which can be used to describe and state
properties of L-models. In particular, the formula B jφ reads as “agent j Believes φ”.
Its truth conditions are defined in such a way that B jφ holds in a possible world when
φ holds in all the worlds agent j considers possible. Dually, the formula 〈B j〉φ reads as
“agent j considers possible that φ holds”.
Definition 2 (Language L). We define the language L inductively as follows:
L : φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | B jφ
where p ranges over Φ and j over Agt. The formula φ ∨ ψ is an abbreviation for
¬(¬φ ∧ ¬ψ); φ → ψ is an abbreviation for ¬φ ∨ ψ; and 〈B j〉φ is an abbreviation for
¬B j¬φ. 2 If φ ∈ L, then we note P(φ) the set of atomic events appearing in φ.
Let M be a L-model, w ∈ M and φ ∈ L. The satisfaction relation M,w |= φ is
defined inductively as follows:
M,w |= p iff w ∈ V(p)
M,w |= ¬φ iff not M,w |= φ
M,w |= φ ∧ ψ iff M,w |= φ and M,w |= ψ
M,w |= B jφ iff for all v ∈ R j(w),M, v |= φ
We write M |= φ when M,w |= φ for all w ∈ M, and |= φ when M |= φ for all L-model
M. 
Example 1. Assume that agents A, B and C play a card game with three cards: a
white one, a red one and a blue one. Each of them has a single card but they do not
know the cards of the other players. At each step of the game, some of the players
show their/her/his card to another player or to both other players, either privately or
publicly. We want to study and represent the dynamics of the agents’ beliefs in this
game. The initial situation is represented by the pointed L-model (M,w) of Figure 1.
In this example, Φ = {r j, b j,w j | j ∈ {A, B,C}} where r j stands for ‘agent j has the red
card’, b j stands for ‘agent j has the blue card’ and w j stands for ‘agent j has the white
card’. The boxed possible world corresponds to the actual world. The propositional
letters not mentioned in the possible worlds do not hold in these possible worlds. The
accessibility relations are represented by arrows indexed by agents between possible
worlds. Reflexive arrows are omitted in the figure, which means that for all worlds
v ∈ M and all agents j ∈ {A, B,C}, v ∈ R j(v). In this model, we have for example the
following statement: M,w |= (wB ∧ ¬BAwB) ∧ BC¬BAwB. It states that player A does
not ‘know’ that player B has the white card and player C ‘knows’ it. 
Theorem 1 (Soundness and completeness of K). [Blackburn et al., 2001] The logic K
is defined by the following axiom schemata and inference rules:
(Propositional) All propositional axiom schemata and inference rules
(B j-distribution) ` B j(φ→ ψ)→ (B jφ→ B jψ)
(B j-necessitation) If ` φ then ` B jφ
2The degree deg(φ) of a formula φ ∈ L is defined inductively as follows: deg(p) = 0, deg(¬φ) =
deg(φ), deg(φ ∧ ψ) = max{deg(φ), deg(ψ)}, deg(B jφ) = 1 + deg(φ). We define similarly the degree deg(φ′)
of a formula φ′ from the language L′ of Definition 5.
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Figure 1: Cards Example
A formula φ ∈ L is a K-theorem, written φ ∈ K or ` φ, when φ can be derived by
successively applying (some of) the inference rules on (some of) the axioms. We say that
φ is K-inconsistent when ¬φ is derivable in K, and K-consistent otherwise. Then, for
all φ ∈ L, ` φ implies that |= φ (soundness), and |= φ implies that ` φ (completeness).
2.2 Representation of the event: L′-model
The propositional letters p′ describing events are called atomic events and range over
an infinite set Φ′. To each atomic event p′, we assign a formula Pre(p′) of the language
L, which is called the precondition of p′. This precondition corresponds to the prop-
erty that should be true at any world w of a L-model so that the atomic event p′ can
‘physically’ occur in this world w. Note that the definition below constrains indirectly
the definition of the infinite set Φ′.
Definition 3 (Precondition function). A precondition function Pre : Φ′ → L is a
function which assigns to each propositional letter p′ a formula of L such that for all
ψ ∈ L, there is p′ ∈ Φ′ such that Pre(p′) = ψ. 
A pointed L′-model (M′,w′) represents how the actual event represented by w′ is
perceived by the agents.
Definition 4 (L′-model). A L′-model is a tuple M′ = (W ′,R′,V ′) where W ′ is a non-
empty set of possible events, R′ : Agt → 2W′×W′ is a function assigning to each agent
j ∈ Agt an accessibility relation on W ′, and V ′ : Φ′ → 2W′ is a function called a
valuation assigning to each propositional letter of Φ′ a subset of W ′ such that
for all w′ ∈ W ′, there is at most one p′ such that w′ ∈ V(p′). (Exclusivity)
We write w′ ∈ M′ for w′ ∈ W ′, and (M′,w′) is called a pointedL′-model. If w′, v′ ∈ W ′,
we write w′R′jv
′ for R′( j)(w′, v′) and R′j(w
′) for {v′ ∈ W ′ | w′R′jv′}. 
Intuitively, v′ ∈ R j(w′) means that while the possible event represented by w′ is oc-
curring, agent j considers possible that the possible event represented by v′ is actually
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occurring. The condition (Exclusivity) expresses in our framework the fact that a single
precondition is assigned to each possible event, as in the standard BMS framework of
[Baltag & Moss, 2004].
In fact, the definition of a L′-model is equivalent to the definition of an action
signature in the logical formalism of [Baltag & Moss, 2004]. Indeed, an action sig-
nature is a tuple Σ = (W ′,R′, (w′1, . . . ,w
′
n)) where: 1) W
′ is a non-empty and finite
set of action types (possible events are called “action types” in the BMS formalism),
2) R′ : Agt → 2W′×W′ is a function assigning to each agent j ∈ Agt an accessibility
relation on W ′, and 3) {w′1, . . . ,w′n} is a subset of W ′ such that for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
if i , j then w′i , w
′
j. If we consider an action signature Σ = (W
′,R′, (w′1, . . . ,w
′
n))
together with a set of formulas φ1, . . . , φn ∈ L, then we can get back an L′-model:
the L′-model associated to (Σ, φ1, . . . , φn) is the tuple M′ = (W ′,R′,V ′) where for all
p′ ∈ Φ′, V ′(p′) is equal to {w′i} if Pre(p′) = φi for some i, and equal to the empty set
otherwise.
Just as we defined a language L for epistemic models, we also define a language
L′ for L′-models whose truth conditions are identical to the ones of the language L.
This language was already introduced in [Baltag et al., 1999]. In the sequel, formulas
of L′ will always be indexed by the quotation mark ’, unlike formulas of L.
Definition 5 (Language L′). We define the language L′ inductively as follows:
L′ : φ′ ::= p′ | ¬φ′ | φ′ ∧ φ′ | B jφ′
where p′ ranges over Φ′ and j over Agt. The formula φ′ ∨ ψ′ is an abbreviation for
¬(¬φ′ ∧ ¬ψ′); φ′ → ψ′ is an abbreviation for ¬φ′ ∨ ψ′; and 〈B j〉φ′ is an abbreviation
for ¬B j¬φ′. If φ′ ∈ L′, then we note P′(φ′) the set of atomic events appearing in φ′.
Let M′ be a L′-model, w′ ∈ M′ and φ′ ∈ L′. The satisfaction relation M′,w′ |= φ′
is defined inductively as follows:
M′,w′ |= p′ iff w′ ∈ V ′(p′)
M′,w′ |= ¬φ′ iff not M′,w′ |= φ′
M′,w′ |= φ′ ∧ ψ′ iff M′,w′ |= φ′ and M′,w′ |= ψ′
M′,w′ |= B jφ′ iff for all v′ ∈ R′j(w′),M′, v′ |= φ′.
We write M′ |= φ′ when M′,w′ |= φ′ for all w′ ∈ M′, and |= φ′ when M′ |= φ′ for all
L′-model M′. 
Example 2. Let us resume Example 1 and assume that players A and B show their
card to each other. As it turns out, C noticed that A showed her card to B but did not
notice that B did so to A. Players A and B know this. This event is represented in the
L′-model (M′,w′) of Figure 2. The boxed possible event w′ corresponds to the actual
event. The atomic event p′ stands for ‘player A shows her red card’, q′ stands for the
atomic event ‘player A shows her white card’ and r′ stands for the atomic event ‘players
A and B show their red and white cards respectively to each other’. The precondition
Pre(p′) of p′ is rA, the precondition Pre(q′) of q′ is wA, and the precondition Pre(r′) of
r′ is rA∧wB. We mention in the possible events of theL′-model only the atomic events
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Figure 2: Players A and B show their cards to each other in front of player C
that hold in these possible events. The following statement holds in our example:
M′,w′ |= r′ ∧ (〈BA〉r′ ∧ BAr′) ∧ (〈BB〉r′ ∧ BBr′)
∧ (〈BC〉p′ ∧ 〈BC〉q′ ∧ BC (p′ ∨ q′)) (1)
It states that players A and B show their cards to each other, players A and B ‘know’
this and consider it possible, while player C considers possible that player A shows her
white card and also considers possible that player A shows her red card, since he does
not know her card. In fact, that is all that player C considers possible since he believes
that either player A shows her red card or her white card. 
Remark 1. Note that the ontological nature of events (such as ‘looking at the card’
versus ‘being shown the card’) is irrelevant as far as change of beliefs about the world
is concerned, because the epistemic change potential of epistemic events is fully deter-
mined by their preconditions and their epistemic indistinguishability. However, when
it comes to account for change of beliefs about events themselves, their ontological
nature does play a role, because this ontological nature may be the subject of pre-
conditions of some other ‘meta’-events. The change of beliefs about events due to
the occurrence of some other ‘meta’-events is studied within the DEL framework in
[Aucher, 2009].
Now, we introduce the notion of P′-complete models which will play a technical
role in the axiomatization of our DEL-sequents in the next sections.
Definition 6 (P′-complete L′-model). Let P′ be a finite subset of Φ′. A P′-complete
L′-model is a L′-model M′ such that
for all w′ ∈ M′, there is a unique p′ ∈ P′ such that w′ ∈ V ′(p′). (P′-complete)
A complete L′-model is a Φ′-complete L′-model M′. 
Theorem 2 (Soundness and completeness of K′ and KP’). The logic K′ is defined by
the following axiom schemata and inference rules:
(Propositional) All propositional axiom schemata and inference rules
(B j-distribution) `′ B j(φ′ → ψ′)→ (B jφ′ → B jψ′)
(B j-necessitation) If `′ φ′ then `′ B jφ′
(Exclusivity) `′ p′ → ¬q′ for all p′ , q′
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Let P′ be a finite subset of Φ′. The logic KP’ is defined by adding to the logic K′ the
following axiom:
(P′-Complete) `′
∨
p′∈P′
p′
We say that a formula φ′ ∈ L′ is a K′-theorem, written φ′ ∈ K′ or `′ φ′, when φ′ can be
derived by successively applying (some of) the inference rules on (some of) the axioms
of K′. We say that φ′ is K′-inconsistent when ¬φ′ is derivable in K′, and K′-consistent
otherwise. Then, for all φ′ ∈ L′, `′ φ′ implies that |=′ φ′ (soundness) and |=′ φ′ implies
`′ φ′ (completeness). Similar definitions and results hold for KP’.
Proof (Sketch). Soundness is standard. Completeness can easily be proved by adapting
the canonical model construction for K given in [Blackburn et al., 2001].
2.3 Update of the initial situation by the event: product update
The precondition function of Definition 3 induces a precondition function for L′-
models, which assigns to each possible event w′ of a L′-model a formula of L. This
formula corresponds to the property that should be true at any world w of a L-model
so that the possible event w′ can ‘physically’ occur in the world w.
Definition 7 (Precondition function of a L′-model). Let M′ = (W ′,R′,V ′) be a L′-
model. The precondition function of M′ is the function Pre : W ′ → L defined as
follows:
Pre(w′) =
{
Pre(p′) if there is p′ such that M′,w′ |= p′
> otherwise. (2)
where > is any K-theorem. 
We then redefine equivalently in our setting the BMS product update of [Baltag & Moss, 2004].
This product update takes as argument a pointed L-model (M,w) and a pointed L′-
model (M′,w′) representing respectively how an initial situation is perceived by the
agents and how an event occurring in this situation is perceived by them, and yields a
new pointedL-model (M,w)⊗(M′,w′) representing how the new situation is perceived
by the agents after the occurrence of the event.
Definition 8 (Product update). Let (M,w) = (W,R,V,w) be a pointed L-model and
(M′,w′) = (W ′,R′,V ′,w′) be a pointed L′-model such that M,w |= Pre(w′). The
product update of (M,w) and (M′,w′) is the pointed L-model (M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′) =
(W⊗,R⊗,V⊗, (w,w′)) defined as follows:
W⊗ =
{
(v, v′) ∈ W ×W ′
∣∣∣∣∣ M, v |= Pre(v′)} (3)
R⊗j (v, v
′) =
{
(u, u′) ∈ W⊗
∣∣∣∣∣ u ∈ R j(v) and u′ ∈ R′j(v′)} (4)
V⊗(p) =
{
(v, v′) ∈ W⊗
∣∣∣∣∣ M, v |= p} (5)

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Figure 3: Situation after the update of the situation represented in Figure 1 by the event
represented in Figure 2
Example 3. As a result of the event described in Example 2, the agents update their
beliefs. We get the situation represented in theL-model (M,w)⊗ (M′,w′) of Figure ??.
In this model, we have for example the following statement:
(M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′) |= (wB ∧ BAwB) ∧ BC¬BAwB.
It states that player A ‘knows’ that player B has the white card but player C believes
that it is not the case. 
3 Mathematical Intermezzo
In this section, we introduce some mathematical objects that will play a central role
from a technical point of view in the sequel.
3.1 Kit Fine’s formulas
We will resort in our proofs to particular kinds of modal formulas which capture the
structure of epistemic models (modulo bisimulation) up to a given modal depth. These
formulas were defined in [Moss, 2007] and are very similar to the normal form formu-
las for modal logic which were originally introduced in [Fine, 1975]. In Section 3.1.1,
we introduce them for the logic K. We will adapt these definitions for the logics K′ and
KP’ in Section 3.1.2. Note that a similar work has been done in [Moss, 2007] for other
logics and languages, notably for the modal language with the ‘star’ operator.
3.1.1 Kit Fine’s formulas for K
A Kit Fine formula δn+1 provides a complete syntactic representation of a pointed L-
model up to modal depth n + 1. So, intuitively, if we view a Kit Fine formula δn+1
of S Pn+1 as the syntactic representation up to modal depth n + 1 of a possible world w
where it holds, a formula δn of S
j
n can also be viewed as a syntactic representation up to
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modal depth n of a possible world accessible by R j from w. This justifies our notations
in Equation 7.
Definition 9 (Sets S Pn ). [Moss, 2007] Let P be a finite subset of Φ. We define induc-
tively the sets S Pn for n ∈ N as follows:
S P0 =
∧p∈S 0 p ∧
∧
p<S 0
¬p
∣∣∣∣∣ S 0 ⊆ P
 (6)
S Pn+1 =
δ0 ∧ ∧j∈Agt
 ∧
δn∈S jn
〈B j〉δn ∧ B j
 ∨
δn∈S jn
δn


∣∣∣∣∣ δ0 ∈ S P0 , S jn ⊆ S Pn
 .
A formula of δ ∈ S Pn for some n > 0 will often be written as follows:
δ = δ0 ∧
∧
j∈Agt
 ∧
γ∈R j(δ)
〈B j〉γ ∧ B j
 ∨
γ∈R j(δ)
γ

 . (7)

The following proposition not only tells us that a formula δn completely character-
izes the structure up to modal depth n of any pointed epistemic model where it holds
(first item), but also that the structure of any epistemic model up to modal depth n can
be characterized by such a formula δn (second item). If (M,w) is a pointed L-model,
then δn(w) will denote the unique element of S Pn such that M,w |= δn(w).
Proposition 3. [Moss, 2007] Let n ∈ N and let P be a finite set of propositional letters.
Let φ ∈ L be such that deg(φ) ≤ n and such that P(φ) ⊆ P.
1. For all δn ∈ S Pn , either δn → φ ∈ K or δn → ¬φ ∈ K.
2.
∨
δn∈S Pn
δn ∈ K.
The following corollary will play an important role in the sequel. It states that any
formula (of degree n) can be reduced to a disjunction of δns. This explains why these
formulas are called normal form formulas. The decomposition of a formula φ into
δs somehow captures completely and syntactically the relevant structure of the set of
pointed L-models which make φ true: each δ can be seen as a syntactic description
of the modal structure (up to depth n and modulo bisimulation) of a pointed L-model
which makes φ true.
Corollary 1. Let n ∈ N and let P be a finite subset of Φ. Let φ ∈ L be such that
deg(φ) ≤ n and P(φ) ⊆ P. Then, there is S ⊆ S Pn (possibly empty) such that φ ↔∨
δ∈S
δ ∈ K.
Proof. Let δ1n, . . . , δ
k
n be the formulas of S
P
n such that δ
i
n → φ ∈ K for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Then δ1n ∨ . . . ∨ δkn → φ ∈ K. Then, by Proposition 3, for all δn ∈ S Pn such that
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δn , δ1n, . . . , δn , δ
k
n, we have that δn → ¬φ ∈ K. Therefore φ → ¬δn ∈ K for all
δn ∈ S Pn such that δn , δ1n, . . . , δn , δkn. However, because
∨
δn∈S Pn
δn ∈ K, we have
φ→ δ1n ∨ . . . ∨ δkn ∈ K. Finally, φ↔ (δ1n ∨ . . . ∨ δkn) ∈ K.
3.1.2 Kit Fine’s formulas for K′ and KP’
In this section, we adapt the definitions and propositions of the previous section for the
logic K′ and KP’. We also define the notion of precondition of a Kit Fine formula for
K′ and KP’.
Definition 10 (Sets S P
′
n and E
P′
n ). Let P
′ be a finite subset of Φ′. We define inductively
the sets S P
′
n and E
P′
n for n ∈ N as follows:
S P
′
0 =P
′ ∪
 ∧p′∈P′¬p′
 (8)
S P
′
n+1 =
δ′0 ∧ ∧j∈Agt
 ∧
δ′n∈S jn
〈B j〉δ′n ∧ B j
 ∨
δ′n∈S jn
δ′n


∣∣∣∣∣ δ′0 ∈ S P′0 , S jn ⊆ S P′n

EP
′
0 =P
′ (9)
EP
′
n+1 =
δ′0 ∧ ∧j∈Agt
 ∧
δ′n∈S jn
〈B j〉δn ∧ B j
 ∨
δ′n∈S jn
δ′n


∣∣∣∣∣ δ′0 ∈ EP′0 , S jn ⊆ EP′n

A formula of δ′ ∈ S P′n ∪ EP
′
n for some n > 0 will often be written as follows:
δ′ = δ′0 ∧
∧
j∈Agt
 ∧
γ′∈R j(δ′)
〈B j〉γ′ ∧ B j
 ∨
γ′∈R j(δ′)
γ′

 .

Note that the only difference between formulas of S P
′
n and E
P′
n lies in the definition
of S P
′
0 and E
P′
0 : the latter only contains formulas of the form p
′ whereas the former
also contains the formula
∧
p′∈P′
¬p′.
Example 4. Formula 1 of Example 2 belongs to EP
′
1 , with P
′ =
{
p′, q′, r′
}
. 
The following Propositions 4 and 5 are the counterpart of Proposition 3 for the log-
ics K′ and KP’, respectively. Both propositions are proved by induction on n, similarly
to Proposition 3.
Proposition 4. Let n ∈ N and let P′ be a finite subset of Φ′. Let φ′ ∈ L′ be such that
deg(φ′) ≤ n and such that P′(φ′) ⊆ P′.
1. For all δ′n ∈ S P
′
n , either δ
′
n → φ′ ∈ K′ or δ′n → ¬φ′ ∈ K′.
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2.
∨
δ′n∈S P′n
δ′n ∈ K′.
Proposition 5. Let n ∈ N and let P′ be a finite subset of Φ′. Let φ′ ∈ L′ be such that
deg(φ′) ≤ n.
1. For all δ′n ∈ EP
′
n , either δ
′
n → φ′ ∈ KP’ or δ′n → ¬φ′ ∈ KP’.
2.
∨
δ′n∈EP′n
δ′n ∈ KP’.
The following Corollaries 2 and 3 are the counterpart of Corollary 1 for the logics
K′ and KP’, respectively. Both corollaries are proved similarly to Corollary 1.
Corollary 2. Let n ∈ N and let P′ be a finite subset of Φ′. Let φ′ ∈ L′ be such that
deg(φ′) ≤ n and such that P′(φ′) ⊆ P′. Then, there is S ′ ⊆ S P′n (possibly empty) such
that φ′ ↔
∨
δ′∈S ′
δ′ ∈ K′.
Corollary 3. Let n ∈ N and let P′ be a finite subset of Φ′. Let φ′ ∈ L′ be such that
deg(φ′) ≤ n. Then, there is E′ ⊆ EP′n (possibly empty) such that φ′ ↔
∨
δ′∈E′
δ′ ∈ KP’.
The following proposition relates K′-consistency with KP’-consistency.
Proposition 6. Let φ′ ∈ L′. The formula φ′ is K′-consistent if and only if φ′ is KP’-
consistent, and so for any finite subset P′ of Φ′ such that P′(φ′) ⊂ P′.
Proof. The right to left direction is trivial. Assume that φ′ is K′-consistent. Then, by
completeness of K′, there is a pointed L′-model (M′,w′) such that M′,w′ |= φ′. The
L′-model (M′,w′) can easily be modified using an atomic event q′ ∈ P′ − P′(φ′) so
that the resulting pointed L′-model (M′P′ ,w′P′ ) still makes φ′ true and is P′-complete:
it suffices to assign the atomic event q′ to any possible event w′ of M′ which does not
make any p′ ∈ P′(φ′) true. So, by completeness of KP’, φ′ is KP’-consistent, and so for
any finite subset P′ of Φ′ such that P′(φ′) ⊂ P′.
The precondition of a Kit Fine formula δ′ is naturally defined as follows:
Definition 11 (Precondition of δ′, Pre(δ′)). Let δ′ = δ′0∧
∧
j∈Agt
 ∧
γ′∈R j(δ′)
〈B j〉γ′ ∧ B j
 ∨
γ′∈R j(δ′)
γ′

 ∈
S P
′
n ∪EP
′
n for some n ≥ 0. We define the precondition of δ′, written Pre(δ′), as follows:
Pre(δ′) =
{
Pre(p′) if δ′0 = p
′
> otherwise. (10)

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3.2 Refinement
A refinement is the dual of a simulation, the classical notion of bisimulation being both
a refinement and a simulation at the same time [Blackburn et al., 2001].
Definition 12 (Refinement). Let M1 = (W1,R1,V1) and M2 = (W2,R2,V2) be two L-
models (or L′-models). A non-empty relation R ⊆ W1 ×W2 is a refinement iff for all
(w1,w2) ∈ R:
• for all p ∈ Φ, w1 ∈ V1(p) if and only if w2 ∈ V2(p)
• for all v2 ∈ R j(w2), there is v1 ∈ R j(w1) such that (v1, v2) ∈ R.
We say that (M2,w2) is a refinement of (M1,w1), which we write M1,w1←M2,w2, if
and only if there exists a refinement relation R ⊆ W1 × W2 such that (w1,w2) ∈ R.
We say that (M2,w2) is a refinement up to modal depth n of (M1,w1), which we write
M1,w1←nM2,w2, if and only if there exists a refinement relation R on the restriction of
M1 to
 ⋃
j∈Agt
R j
≤n (w1) and the restriction of M2 to
 ⋃
j∈Agt
R j
≤n (w2) such that (w1,w2) ∈
R.3

The following result will turn out to play a central role in the definition of our
notion of progression of φ by φ′ in Section 5.
Proposition 7. [van Ditmarsch & French, 2008] Let M1 and M2 be two finiteL-models.
M1←M2 if and only if there is a L′-model M′ such that M1 ⊗ M′ = M2.
Now, we provide a syntactic characterization of the notion of refinement up to
modal depth n. Intuitively, the refinement of a L-model is another L-model where
some accessibility relations have been removed, modulo bisimulation. This cutting of
accessibility relations is reflected in the subset condition of Equation 12.
Definition 13 (Function Re f ). Let n ∈ N and let P be a finite subset of Φ. We define
the function Re f : S Pn → 2S
P
n inductively as follows:
n = 0: for all δ0 ∈ S P0 ,
Re f (δ0) = {δ0} (11)
n + 1: if δ = δ0 ∧
∧
j∈Agt
 ∧
δn−1∈R j(δn)
〈B j〉δn ∧ B j
∨
δn−1∈R j(δn)
δn
, then
Re f (δ) =
{
δ0 ∧
∧
j∈Agt
 ∧
δ j∈Re f (R j(δ))
〈B j〉δ j ∧ B j
∨
δ j∈Re f (R j(δ))
δ j
∣∣∣∣∣ Re f (R j(δ)) ⊆ {Re f (δ j) ∣∣∣∣∣ δ j ∈ R j(δ)}} (12)
3If R is a relation and n ∈ N, R≤n is defined by R≤n(w) = {v| there is w = w0, . . . ,wk = v such that wiRwi+1
and k ≤ n} if n > 0, and R≤0(w) = {w}.
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Proposition 8. For all pointed L-models (M1,w1) and (M2,w2), M1,w1←nM2,w2 if
and only if δn(w2) ∈ Re f (δn(w1)).
Proof. By induction on n. The case n = 0 is clear. We prove the induction step.
M1,w1←n+1M2,w2
iff δ0(w1) = δ0(w2) and
for all v2 ∈ R j(w2) there is v1 ∈ R j(w1) such that M1, v1←nM2, v2
iff δ0(w1) = δ0(w2) and
for all v2 ∈ R j(w2) there is v1 ∈ R j(w1) such that δn(v2) ∈ Re f (δn(v1))
by induction hypothesis
iff δ0(w1) = δ0(w2) and
for all δn ∈ R j(δn+1(w2)) there is δ∗n ∈ R j(δn+1(w1)) such that δn ∈ Re f (δ∗n)
iff δ0(w1) = δ0(w2) and
R j(δn+1(w2)) ⊆ {Re f (δn) | δn ∈ R j(δn+1(w1))}
iff δn+1(w2) ∈ Re f (δn+1(w1)).
4 Definition and axiomatization of φ, φ′ φ′′
Definition 14 (Inference relation φ, φ′ φ′′). Let φ, φ′′ ∈ L and φ′ ∈ L′. The inference
relation φ, φ′ φ′′ is defined as follows:
φ, φ′ φ′′ iff for all pointed L-model (M,w), and L′-model (M′,w′) such
that M,w |= Pre(w′), if M,w |= φ and M′,w′ |= φ′ then
(M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′) |= φ′′

We first provide in Section 4.1 a sequent calculus for the case of epistemic events,
i.e. events which do not change atomic facts in a situation. The case of ontic events,
i.e. events which change atomic facts, will be dealt with in Section 4.2.
4.1 DEL-Sequent Calculus for epistemic events
Definition 15 (DEL-Sequent Calculus SC). The DEL-Sequent Calculus SC is defined
by the following axiom schemata and inference rules. Below, ⊥ (resp. >) stands for
any K-inconsistent formula (resp. K-theorem), and ⊥′ (resp. >′) stands for any K′-
inconsistent formula (resp. K′-theorem).
⊥, φ′ φ′′ A1 φ,⊥′ φ′′ A2 φ, φ′ > A3
p,>′ p A4 ¬p,>′ ¬p A5 ¬Pre(p′), p′ ⊥ A6
φ, φ′ φ′′ φ, φ′ φ′′ → ψ′′
φ, φ′ ψ′′
R1
φ ∧ ψ, φ′ φ′′ ¬ψ, φ′ φ′′
φ, φ′ φ′′
R2
φ, φ′ ∧ ψ′ φ′′ φ,¬ψ′ φ′′
φ, φ′ φ′′
R3
φ, φ′ φ′′
B jφ, B jφ′ B jφ′′
R4
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φ, φ′ φ′′
〈B j〉(φ ∧ Pre(p′)), 〈B j〉(φ′ ∧ p′) 〈B j〉φ′′
R5

The key axiom schemata and inference rules are A4, A5, R4 and R5. They permit
to build all the valid DEL-sequents by induction on the degree of the formula. Axiom
schemata A4 and A5 can be seen as the base case, and rules R4 and R5 (together with
the rest of the axiom schemata) can be seen as the induction steps allowing to build
DEL-sequents of higher degree. Axiom schemata A4 and A5 also illustrates the fact
that we deal as in the standard framework of DEL with epistemic events, i.e. events
which do not change atomic facts. We will see in the next section that axiom schemata
A4 and A5 can be adapted in order to deal with ontic events, i.e. events that change
atomic facts. Axiom schema A6 illustrates the fact that an atomic event can occur only
in a possible world where its precondition holds.
These axiom schemata and inference rules provide a formal and accurate analysis
of the product update. It turns out that the informal motivations for the definition of the
product update in [Baltag & Moss, 2004] are somehow formalized by rule R5. Here is
how the product update was informally motivated in this paper (the notations in this
quotation are replaced by our notations):
“The update product restricts the full Cartesian product W × W ′ to the
smaller set W ⊗ W ′ in order to insure that states survive actions in the
appropriate sense. [...] The components of our L′-models are “simple
actions”, so the uncertainty regarding the action is assumed to be indepen-
dent of the uncertainty regarding the current (input) state. This indepen-
dence allows us to “multiply” these two uncertainties in order to compute
the uncertainty regarding the output state: if whenever the input state is w,
agent j thinks the input might be some other state v, and if whenever the
current action happening is w′, agent j thinks the current action might be
some other action v′, and if v survives v′, then whenever the output state
(w,w′) is reached, agent j thinks the alternative output state (v, v′) might
have been reached.”
[Baltag & Moss, 2004]
Now, if one thinks of formulas φ, φ′ and φ′′ in rule R5 as representing respectively the
input state v, the action v′ and the output state (v, v′), then the conclusion of this rule
somehow formalizes these informal motivations.
We propose below a second DEL-Sequent Calculus SC∗, which will be proved
equivalent to the first DEL-Sequent Calculus SC in Section 4.3. Note that Rules R7
and R8 below are similar to the introduction rules of disjunction of Gentzen’s sequent
calculus, and rule R6 (and in a sense also rules R9 and R10) is similar to the introduction
rules of conjunction of Gentzen’s sequent calculus.
Definition 16 (DEL-Sequent Calculus SC∗). The DEL-Sequent Calculus SC∗ is de-
fined by the following axiom schemata and inference rules, together with the axiom
schemata A2 and A6 and inference rules R4 and R5 of the DEL-Sequent Calculus SC.
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Below, φp stands for any propositional formula.
φp,>′ ∗ φp A7
φ, φ′ ∗ φ′′ φ, φ′ ∗ ψ′′
φ, φ′ ∗ φ′′ ∧ ψ′′ R6
φ, φ′ ∗ φ′′ φ, ψ′ ∗ φ′′
φ, φ′ ∨ ψ′ ∗ φ′′ R7
φ, φ′ ∗ φ′′ ψ, φ′ ∗ φ′′
φ ∨ ψ, φ′ ∗ φ′′ R8
φ, φ′ ∗ φ′′
ψ, φ′ ∗ ψ′′
R9
φ, φ′ ∗ φ′′
φ, ψ′ ∗ φ′′
R10
where ψ→ φ ∈ K and φ′′ → ψ′′ ∈ K. where ψ′ → φ′ ∈ K′.

As we said in the introduction, [Baltag et al., 2005, Baltag et al., 2007] provides in
an algebraic setting a sequent calculus whose sequents can be arbitrarily long and con-
sist of different types of formulas which can contain propositions, events and agents,
and which resolve into a single proposition or event. However, one has to admit that
these sequents do not have an easy and intuitive reading. For the specific case of public
announcements, a complete axiomatization for a sequent of the form φ1, . . . , φn ` ψ
has also been proposed in [van Benthem, 2003]. The reading of this sequent is ‘after
successive public announcements of the premises, we reach a situation where the an-
nouncement of ψ effects no change’. This work is extended in [Cordon-Franco et al., 2010]
to take into account a background set of formulas known or commonly known by the
agents, which makes it closer to our tripartite approach. However, they do not provide
a complete axiomatization of their two consequence relations.
4.2 DEL-Sequent Calculus for ontic events
To deal with ontic events, we follow the approach of [van Benthem et al., 2006] and
associate to each propositional variable p′ ∈ Φ′ a substitution function Sub(p′) : Φ →
L. Intuitively, Sub(p′)(p) is a sufficient and necessary condition before the occurrence
of p′ for p to be true after the occurrence of p′. This substitution function induces a
substitution function Sub(M′,w′) over pointed L′-models (M′,w′):
Sub(M′,w′)(p) =
{
Sub(p′)(p) if M′,w′ |= p′ for some p′ ∈ Φ′
p otherwise. (13)
Then, the new valuation of Equation 5 in Definition 8 is defined as follows:
V⊗(p) =
{(
v, v′
) ∈ W⊗ ∣∣∣∣∣ M, v |= Sub(M′, v′)(p)} . (14)
One can easily show that this new definition of the product update is axiomatized by
replacing axiom schemata A4 and A5 by the following axiom schemata:
A′4 Sub(p
′)(p), p′ p
A′5 ¬Sub(p′)(p), p′ ¬p
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4.3 Soundness and completeness of SC and SC∗
Theorem 9 (Soundness of SC). Let φ, φ′′ ∈ L and φ′ ∈ L′. If φ, φ′ φ′′ then
φ, φ′ φ′′.
Proof. We only prove the soundness of R4 and R5. The proofs of soundness of the
other axiom schemata and inference rules are standard.
Soundness of R4. Assume that φ, φ
′ φ′′. We are going to prove that B jφ, B jφ′
B jφ′′. Let (M,w) be a pointed L-model and (M′,w′) be a pointed L′-models such that
M,w |= Pre(w′), M,w |= B jφ and M′,w′ |= B jφ′. Then for all v ∈ R j(w) M, v |= φ and
for all v′ ∈ R j(w′), M′, v′ |= φ′. So for all v′ ∈ R j(w′) and all v ∈ R j(w) such that M, v |=
Pre(v′), M, v |= φ and M′, v′ |= φ′. So for all (v, v′) ∈ R j(w,w′), (M, v) ⊗ (M′, v′) |= φ′′
by definition of φ, φ′ φ′′. So (M,w)⊗ (M′,w′) |= B jφ′′. Therefore B jφ, B jφ′ B jφ′′.
Soundness of R5. Assume that φ, φ
′ φ′′. We are going to prove that 〈B j〉(φ ∧
Pre(p′)), 〈B j〉(φ′ ∧ p′) 〈B j〉φ′′. Let (M,w) be a pointed L-model and (M′,w′) be a
pointed L′-model such that M,w |= Pre(w′), M,w |= 〈B j〉(φ ∧ Pre(p′)) and M′,w′ |=
〈B j〉(φ′ ∧ p′). Then there is v′ ∈ R j(w′) such that M′, v′ |= φ′ and there is v ∈ R j(w)
such that M, v |= φ ∧ Pre(v′). Therefore (M, v) ⊗ (M′, v′) |= φ′′ because φ, φ′ φ′′. So
(M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′) |= 〈B j〉φ′′ because (v, v′) ∈ R j(w,w′).
The proof of completeness of Theorem 14 is based on the following rough ideas.
For any φ, φ′′ ∈ L and φ′ ∈ L′, the DEL-sequent φ, φ′ φ′′ is provably equivalent to a
disjunction of δ, δ′ δ′′, because formulas φ, φ′ and φ′′ are themselves provably equiv-
alent to a disjunction of δs, δ′s and δ′′s respectively. Hence, if we prove completeness
for these normal form formulas, we will inherit the completeness for the full epistemic
and event languages by soundness of SC. Proposition 13 proves this completeness
result for normal form formulas. It relies on Lemmas 10 and 11 which define a set of
axiom schemata and rules derivable in SC, and which extend those of SC∗. Even if
these axiom schemata and inference rules are less intuitive than those of SC, they will
turn out to be more appropriate to prove the completeness of SC.
Lemma 10. For all φ, φ′′ ∈ L and all φ′ ∈ L′, φ, φ′ ∗ φ′′ implies φ, φ′ φ′′.
Proof (Sketch). It suffices to prove that axiom A7 and rulesR6, R7, R8, R9 andR10 from
the DEL-Sequent Calculus SC∗ are all derivable in SC. Rule R10 is derivable from A2
and R3 by considering ⊥ = ψ′ ∧ ¬φ′. The first (resp. second) part of R9 is derivable
from A1 (resp. A3) and R1 (resp. R2) by considering ⊥ = ψ∧¬φ (resp. ⊥ = ψ′′∧¬φ′′).
Rule R6 is derivable from A3 and R1 by considering > = φ′′ → (ψ′′ → (φ′′ ∧ ψ′′)).
Rule R7 is derivable from A2 and R3 by considering ⊥′ = (φ′ ∨ ψ′) ∧ ¬φ′ ∧ ¬ψ′. Rule
R8 is derivable from A1 and R2 by considering ⊥ = (φ ∨ ψ) ∧ ¬φ ∧ ¬ψ.
Lemma 10 entails that in order to prove completeness of SC, we can equivalently
use the axiom schemata and inference rules of SC∗. In the same line, Lemma 11 below
entails that to prove completeness of SC, we can equivalently use the inference rule
R10 or R11.
Lemma 11. Let P′ be a finite subset of Φ′. Let φ, φ′′ ∈ L and φ′, ψ′ ∈ L′ be such that
P′(φ′) ∪ P′(ψ′) ⊂ P′. If ψ′ → φ′ ∈ KP’, then one can prove the following derivation in
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SC:
φ, φ′ φ′′
φ, ψ′ φ′′
R11
Proof. It follows from Proposition 6 that ψ′ → φ′ ∈ KP’ if and only if ψ′ → φ′ ∈ K′,
because P′(ψ′ → φ′) = P′(ψ′) ∪ P′(φ′) ⊂ P′. We then immediately get rule R11 by
application of rule R10.
Lemma 12. Let P′ be a finite subset of Φ′. Let δ′n ∈ EP
′
n and let φ ∈ L be such that
deg(φ) ≤ n. Let P = P(φ)∪
⋃{
P(Pre(p′))
∣∣∣∣∣ p′ ∈ P′} and let N = max {deg(Pre(p′)) | p′ ∈ P′}
and δn+N ∈ S Pn+N . Then, δn+N , δ′n φ does not hold if and only if δn+N , δ′n ¬φ and
δn+N → Pre(δ′n) ∈ K.
Proof (Sketch). This lemma can be rephrased as follows: there are a L-model (M,w)
and a L′-model (M′,w′) such that M,w |= Pre(w′), M,w |= δn+N , M′,w′ |= δ′n and
(M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′) |= φ if and only if δn+N → Pre(δ′n) ∈ K and for all L-model (M,w)
and L′-model (M′,w′) such that M,w |= Pre(w′), M,w |= δn+N and M′,w′ |= δ′n, we
have that (M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′) |= φ.
The proof then follows from the fact that the structure of (M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′) up to
modal depth n and for the atomic facts P(φ) is determined only by the structure of
(M,w) up to modal depth n + N and for the atomic facts P and the modal structure
of (M′,w′) up to modal depth n and for the atomic events P′, which are themselves
completely determined by some δn+N ∈ S Pn+N and δ′n ∈ EP
′
n respectively.
The crucial Proposition 13 proves the soundness and completeness of SC for nor-
mal form formulas. The proof of this proposition is by induction on the degrees of the
formulas δ, δ′ and δ′′. The base case is dealt with by Axiom A7. The induction step is
proved by resorting to the crucial inference rules R4 and R5, and Lemma 12.
Proposition 13. Let P′ be a finite subset of Φ′ and let P be a finite subset of Φ such
that
⋃{
P(Pre(p′))
∣∣∣∣∣ p′ ∈ P′} ⊆ P. Let N = max {deg(Pre(p′)) | p′ ∈ P′}. For all
δn+N ∈ S Pn+N , δ′n ∈ EP
′
n and δ
′′
n ∈ S Pn such that δn+N → Pre(δ′n) ∈ K, it holds that
δn+N , δ
′
n δ
′′
n if and only if δn+N , δ
′
n δ
′′
n .
Proof. We prove it by induction on n. The left to right direction holds by soundness of
Theorem 9. We only prove the right to left direction.
n = 0. Assume that δN , δ′0 δ
′′
0 . Then, because δN → Pre(δ′0) ∈ K, there do exist a
pointed L-model (M,w) and a pointed L′-model (M′,w′) such that M,w |= δN ,
M,w |= Pre(w′) and M′,w′ |= δ′0. Therefore, because the product update of
Definition 8 does not change the valuations, δN → δ′′0 ∈ K. Now, δ′′0 , δ′0 δ′′0 by
Axiom A7. So, by application of rule R9 and because δN → δ′′0 ∈ K, it holds that
δN , δ
′
0 δ
′′
0 .
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n + 1. Let δn+1+N ∈ S Pn+1+N , δ′n+1 ∈ EP
′
n+1 and δ
′′
n+1 ∈ S Pn+1 such that δn+1+N → Pre(δ′n+1) ∈
K:
δn+1+N = δ0 ∧
∧
j∈Agt
∧
i∈I
〈B j〉δn+N,i ∧ B j
∨
i∈I
δn+N,i

δ′n+1 = δ
′
0 ∧
∧
j∈Agt
∧
k∈I′
〈B j〉δ′n,k ∧ B j
∨
k∈I′
δ′n,k

δ′′n+1 = δ
′′
0 ∧
∧
j∈Agt
∧
i∈I′′
〈B j〉δ′′n,i ∧ B j
∨
i∈I′′
δ′′n,i
 .
By assumption, δn+1+N , δ′n+1 δ
′′
n+1. Assume towards a contradiction that δn+1+N , δ
′
n+1 δ
′′
n+1
does not hold. Then, because of rule R6:
either δn+1+N , δ′n+1 δ
′′
0 does not hold, (Case 1)
or δn+1+N , δ′n+1 〈B j〉δ′′n,i does not hold for some i ∈ I′′ (Case 2)
or δn+1+N , δ′n+1 B j
∨
i∈I′′
δ′′n,i
 does not hold (Case 3)
We are going to show that these three cases are all impossible.
(Case 3): Assume that δn+1+N , δ′n+1 B j
∨
i∈I′′
δ′′n,i
 does not hold. Then, by ap-
plication of rules R9 and R10, because δn+1+N → B j
∨
i∈I
δn+N,i
 ∈ K and δ′n+1 →
B j
∨
k∈I′
δ′n,k
 ∈ K′, we have that B j ∨
i∈I
δn+N,i
 , B j ∨
k∈I′
δ′n,k
 B j ∨
i∈I′′
δ′′n,i
 does not hold.
Then, by application of rule R4,∨
i∈I
δn+N,i,
∨
k∈I′
δ′n,k
∨
i∈I′′
δ′′n,i does not hold (15)
We now show that δn+N,i0 , δ
′
n,k0
∨
i∈I′′
δ′′n,i does not hold for some δn+N,i0 and δ
′
n,k0
such that δn+N,i0 → Pre(δ′n,k0 ) ∈ K. Assume towards a contradiction that for all
δn+N,i and δ′n,k such that δn+N,i → Pre(δ′n,k) ∈ K, we have that δn+N,i, δ′n,k
∨
i∈I′′
δ′′n,i.
Let δn+N,i and δn,i be such that δn+N,i → Pre(δ′n,k) < K. We are going to show
that δn+N,i, δ′n,k
∨
i∈I′′
δ′′n,i holds as well in this case. First, by Proposition 3,
δn+N,i → ¬Pre(δ′n,k) ∈ K. Now, by definition of EP
′
n , there is p
′ ∈ P′ such that
δ′n,k → p′ ∈ K′. By Axiom A6, ¬Pre(p′), p′ ⊥. Therefore, ¬Pre(δ′n,k), p′ ⊥
because Pre(δ′n,k) = Pre(p
′). Then, by application of Rules R9 and R10, and
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because δ′n,k → p′ ∈ K′, δn+N,i → ¬Pre(δ′n,k) ∈ K and ⊥ →
∨
i∈I′′
δ′′n,i ∈ K, we obtain
δn+N,i, δ
′
n,k
∨
i∈I′′
δ′′n,i. Hence, for all δn+N,i and δ
′
n,k, we have that δn+N,i, δ
′
n,k
∨
i∈I′′
δ′′n,i.
Therefore, by application of rulesR7 andR8, we have that
∨
i∈I
δn+N,i,
∨
k∈I′
δ′n,k
∨
i∈I′′
δ′′n,i.
This is impossible because of Equation 15. Therefore, δn+N,i0 , δ
′
n,k0
∨
i∈I′′
δ′′n,i does
not hold for some δn+N,i0 and δ
′
n,k0 such that δn+N,i0 → Pre(δ′n,k0 ) ∈ K.
So for all i ∈ I′′, δn+N,i0 , δ′n,k0 δ′′n,i does not hold by application of rule R9. Then,
for all i ∈ I′′, δn+N,i0 , δ′n,k0 δ′′n,i does not hold by induction hypothesis. Then,
by Lemma 12, for all i ∈ I′′, δn+N,i0 , δ′n,k0 ¬δ′′n,i. So δn+N,i0 , δ′n,k0
∧
i∈I′′
¬δ′′n,i. So,
〈B j〉δn+N,i0 , 〈B j〉δ′n,k0 〈B j〉
∧
i∈I′′
¬δ′′n,i by soundness of rule R5, because δn+N,i0 →
Pre(δ′n,k0 ) ∈ K by assumption. Therefore, 〈B j〉δn+N,i0 , 〈B j〉δ′n,k0 ¬B j
∨
i∈I′′
δ′′n,i
.
Then δn+1+N , δ′n+1 ¬δ′′n+1 by soundness of RulesR9 andR10 and because δn+1+N →
〈B j〉δn+N,i0 ∈ K, δ′n+1 → 〈B j〉δ′n,k0 ∈ K′ and ¬B j
∨
i∈I′′
δ′′n,i
 → ¬δ′′n+1 ∈ K. Now, by
assumption, we have that δn+1+N → Pre(δ′n+1) ∈ K. Therefore, by Lemma 12, we
have that δn+1+N , δ′n+1 δ
′′
n+1 does not hold. This is impossible by assumption.
Therefore, (Case 3) cannot hold.
(Case 2): Assume that δn+1+N , δ′n+1 〈B j〉δ′′n,l does not hold for some l ∈ I′′. By
application of R9, because δn+1+N → 〈B j〉δn+N,i ∈ K and δ′n+1 → 〈B j〉δ′n,k ∈ K′,
we obtain that 〈B j〉δn+N,i, 〈B j〉δ′n,k 〈B j〉δ′′n,l does not hold for all i ∈ I and k ∈ I′.
We are going to show that δn+N,i, δ′n,k ¬δ′′n,l for all i ∈ I and k ∈ I′.
1. Let i ∈ I and k ∈ I′ and assume that δn+N,i → ¬Pre(δ′n,k) ∈ K. Let δ′0
be the propositional part of δ′n,k. By A6, we have that ¬Pre(δ′0), δ′0 ⊥.
Then, because Pre(δ′0) = Pre(δ
′
n,k), we obtain ¬Pre(δ′n,k), δ′0 ⊥. Then, by
application of R10, because δ
′
n,k → δ′0 ∈ K′, we obtain ¬Pre(δ′n,k), δ′n,k ⊥.
Therefore, by application of R9, because δn+N,i → ¬Pre(δ′n,k) ∈ K and
⊥ → ¬δ′′n,l ∈ K, we obtain δn+N,i, δn,k ¬δ′′n,l. Finally, by soundness of SC,
δn+N,i, δn,k ¬δ′′n,l.
2. Let i ∈ I and k ∈ I′ and assume that δn+N,i → Pre(δ′n,k) ∈ K. Then
〈B j〉δn+N,i → 〈B j〉(δn+N,i∧Pre(δ′n,k)) ∈ K. Because 〈B j〉δn+N,i, 〈B j〉δ′n,k 〈B j〉δ′′n,l
does not hold, we have that 〈B j〉(δn+N,i ∧ Pre(δ′n,k)), 〈B j〉δ′n,k 〈B j〉δ′′n,l does
not hold either, by application of rule R9. Then δn+N,i, δ
′
n,k δ
′′
n,l does not
hold, by application of rule R5. So δn+N,i, δ
′
n,k δ
′′
n,l does not hold by In-
duction Hypothesis. Then, by Lemma 12, δn+N,i, δ′n,k ¬δ′′n,l.
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Consequently, by application of rulesR8 andR7, for some l ∈ I′′
∨
i∈I
δn+N,i,
∨
k∈I′
δ′n,k ¬δ′′n,l.
Then, B j
∨
i∈I
δn+N,i
 , B j ∨
k∈I′
δ′n,k
 ¬〈B j〉δ′′n,l by rule R4. So δn+N+1, δ′n+1 ¬δ′′n+1
by rule R9, because δn+N+1 → B j
∨
i∈I
δn+N,i
 ∈ K, δ′n+1 → B j
∨
k∈I′
δ′n,k
 ∈ K′ and
¬〈B j〉δ′′n,l → δ′′n+1 ∈ K. Therefore, δn+N+1, δ′n+1 δ′′n+1 does not hold by appli-
cation of Lemma 12, because by assumption δn+N+1 → Pre(δ′n+1) ∈ K. Conse-
quently, (Case 2) cannot hold.
(Case 1): Assume that δn+1+N , δ′n+1 δ
′′
0 does not hold. Assume towards a con-
tradiction that δn+1+N → δ′′0 ∈ K. Then, because δ′′0 , δ′n+1 δ′′0 holds by ax-
iom A7, we have δn+1+N , δ
′
n+1 δ
′′
0 by rule R9, which is impossible. Therefore,
δn+1+N → δ′′0 < K, and so δn+1+N → ¬δ′′0 ∈ K by Proposition 3. Then, because
¬δ′′0 , δ′n+1 ¬δ′′0 by axiom A7, δn+1+N , δ′n+1 ¬δ0 by rule R9. So, by application
of Lemma 12 and because δn+1+N → Pre(δ′n+1) ∈ K by assumption, we obtain
that δn+1+N , δ′n+1 δ
′′
0 does not hold, which is impossible. Therefore, (Case 1)
cannot hold.
Because all three cases are impossible, it is also impossible that δn+1+N , δ′n+1 δ
′′
n+1
does not hold. Therefore, δn+1+N , δ′n+1 δ
′′
n+1 holds.
We have just proved the completeness of SC for normal form formulas. We are
going to lift this completeness result of SC to the full epistemic and event languages
relying on the fact that any DEL-sequent φ, φ′ φ′′ can be reduced equivalently to a
disjunction of δ, δ′ δ′′, and using the soundness of rules R7, R8, R9 and R11.
Theorem 14 (Completeness of SC). Let φ, φ′′ ∈ L and φ′ ∈ L′. If φ, φ′ φ′′ then
φ, φ′ φ′′.
Proof. Let φ, φ′′ ∈ L, and φ′ ∈ L′ such that max{deg(φ), deg(φ′), deg(φ′′)} ≤ n.
Assume that φ, φ′ φ′′.
1. Assume that φ′ is K′-inconsistent. Then, by axiom schemata A2, φ, φ
′ φ′′.
2. Assume that φ′ is K′-consistent. Let P′ be a finite subset of Φ′ such that P′(φ′) ⊂
P′. Then, by Proposition 6, φ′ is KP’-consistent. Let P = P(φ) ∪ P(φ′′) ∪⋃{
P(Pre(p′))
∣∣∣∣∣ p′ ∈ P′}. Therefore, by Corollaries 1 and 3, there are δn+N,i ∈
S Pn , δ
′
n,k ∈ EP
′
n and δ
′′
n,l ∈ S Pn such that φ ↔
∨
i∈I
δn+N,i ∈ K, φ′ ↔
∨
k∈I′
δ′n,k ∈ KP’
and φ′′ ↔
∨
l∈I′′
δ′′n,l ∈ K. Then, φ′ ↔
∨
k∈I′
δ′n,k ∈ KP” for any P′ ⊂ P′′. Therefore, by
soundness of rule R9 and rule R11 of Lemma 11, φ, φ
′ φ′′ iff
∨
i∈I
δn+N,i,
∨
k∈I′
δ′n,k
∨
l∈I′′
δ′′n,l.
Then, still by soundness of rules R7, R8, R9 and R11, we have that φ, φ
′ φ′′ iff
δn+N,i, δ
′
n,k
∨
l∈I′′
δ′′n,l for all i ∈ I and k ∈ I′. Therefore, for all i ∈ I and k ∈ I′,
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δn+N,i, δ
′
n,k
∨
l∈I′′
δ′′n,l (∗). Now, we are going to show that for all i ∈ I and k ∈ I′,
δn+N,i, δ
′
n,k
∨
l∈I′′
δ′′n,l. Let i ∈ I and k ∈ I′.
(a) First, assume that δn+N,i → Pre(δ′n,k) < K. Then, by Proposition 3, δn+N,i →
¬Pre(δ′n,k) ∈ K. Let δ′0 be the propositional part of δ′n,k. Then, by axiom A6,
¬Pre(δ′0), δ′0 ⊥, i.e. ¬Pre(δ′n,k), δ′0 ⊥. Therefore, by rules R9 and R10
and because δ′n,k → δ′0 ∈ K′, δn+N,i → ¬Pre(δ′n,k) ∈ K and ⊥ →
∨
l∈I′′
δ′′n,l ∈ K,
we obtain that δn+N,i, δ′n,k
∨
l∈I′′
δ′′n,l.
(b) Second, assume that δn+N,i → Pre(δ′n,k) ∈ K. Assume towards a contra-
diction that δn+N,i, δ′n,k
∨
l∈I′′
δ′′n,l does not hold. We are going to show that
δn+N,i, δ
′
n,k
∨
l∈I′′
δ′′n,l does not hold, contradicting (∗). By our assumption, for
all l ∈ I′′, δn+N,i, δ′n,k δ′′n,l does not hold. Hence, by application of Propo-
sition 13, and because δn+N,i → Pre(δ′n,k) ∈ K, δn+N,i, δ′n,k δ′′n,l does not
hold for all l ∈ I′′. Then, by application of Lemma 12, δn+N,i, δ′n,k ¬δ′′n,l
for all l ∈ I′′. Hence, δn+N,i, δ′n,k ¬
∨
l∈I′′
δ′′n,l. Therefore, still by appli-
cation of Lemma 12 and because δn+N,i → Pre(δ′n,k) ∈ K, we have that
δn+N,i, δ
′
n,k
∨
l∈I′′
δ′′n,l. This contradicts (∗).
So, we have proved that in both cases, for all i ∈ I and k ∈ I′, δn+N,i, δ′n,k
∨
l∈I′′
δ′′n,l.
Then, by rules R8 and R7,
∨
i∈I
δn+N,i,
∨
k∈I′
δ′n,k
∨
l∈I′′
δ′′n,l . Finally, by rules R9 and
R11, we obtain that φ, φ′ φ′′. 
Theorem 15. [Aucher et al., 2011] Given some formulas φ, φ′′ ∈ L and φ′ ∈ L′,
the problem of determining whether φ, φ′ φ′′ holds is decidable and NEXPTIME-
complete.
The completeness result can be used to show that the Sequent Calculus SC and
SC∗ are provably equivalent.
Proposition 16. Let φ, φ′′ ∈ L and φ′ ∈ L′. It holds that φ, φ′ φ′′ if and only if
φ, φ′ ∗ φ′′.
Proof. By Lemma 10, we have that φ, φ′ ∗ φ′′ implies φ, φ′ φ′′. To prove the second
direction, i.e. φ, φ′ φ′′ implies φ, φ′ ∗ φ′′, it suffices to observe that in the proof
of Theorem 14, we only use the axiom schemata and rules of SC∗. Therefore, if
φ, φ′ φ′′, then φ, φ′ ∗ φ′′. Now, by soundness of SC, we have that φ, φ′ φ′′ implies
φ, φ′ φ′′. Hence, φ, φ′ φ′′ implies φ, φ′ ∗ φ′′.
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5 Progression of φ by φ′: φ ⊗ φ′
The axiomatization of φ, φ′ φ′′ of Definition 15 provides us with a means to compute
all the consequences φ′′ about a situation resulting from the occurrence of an event
described by φ′ in an initial situation described by φ. However, even if this axiomatiza-
tion stays close to the definition of the update product and therefore provides a natural
characterization of updates, we could wonder if there is a more compact way to repre-
sent all these consequences. This is what we will show in this section by introducing
the notion of progression of φ by φ′.
Definition 17 (Progression of φ by φ′, φ ⊗ φ′). Let φ, φ′′ ∈ L and φ′ ∈ L′. Let
n = max{deg(φ), deg(φ′)}, N = max{deg(Pre(p′))
∣∣∣∣∣ p′ ∈ P′(φ′)} and P = P(φ) ∪⋃{
P(Pre(p′))
∣∣∣∣∣ p′ ∈ P′(φ′)}. Then, by Corollaries 1 and 2, there are S ⊆ S Pn+N and
S ′ ⊆ S P′n such that φ↔
∨
δ∈S
δ ∈ K and φ′ ↔
∨
δ′∈S ′
δ′ ∈ K′. We define the progression of φ
by φ′, written φ ⊗ φ′, as follows:
φ ⊗ φ′ =
∨{
δ ⊗ δ′
∣∣∣∣∣ (δ, δ′) ∈ S ⊗ S ′} (16)
where S ⊗ S ′ = {(δ, δ′) ∈ S × S ′
∣∣∣∣∣ δ → Pre(δ′) ∈ K} and for all (δ, δ′) ∈ S ⊗ S ′, δ ⊗ δ′
is defined inductively as follows:
n=0:
δ ⊗ δ′ =
∨
δ′′∈Re f (δ)
δ′′ (17)
n+1: If δ = δ0 ∧
∧
j∈Agt
 ∧
δ j∈R j(δ)
〈B j〉δ j ∧ B j
 ∨
δ j∈R j(δ)
δ j

 ,
δ′ = δ′0 ∧
∧
j∈Agt
 ∧
δ′j∈R j(δ′)
〈B j〉δ′j ∧ B j
 ∨
δ′j∈R j(δ′)
δ′j

 ,
then δ ⊗ δ′ = δ0 ∧
∧
j∈Agt
(∧{
〈B j〉
(
δ j ⊗ δ′j
) ∣∣∣∣∣ (δ j, δ′j) ∈ R j(δ) ⊗ R j(δ′)}
∧B j
(∨{
δ j ⊗ δ′j
∣∣∣∣∣ (δ j, δ′j) ∈ R j(δ) ⊗ R j(δ′)}) )
where R j(δ) ⊗ R j(δ′) =
{
(δ j, δ′j) ∈ R j(δ) × R j(δ′)
∣∣∣∣∣ δ j → Pre(δ′j) ∈ K}. 
Note that if δ and δ′ represent syntactically a pointedL-model (M,w) and a pointed
L′-model (M′,w′) respectively, then the way the formula δ⊗ δ′ is defined is a syntactic
counterpart of the definition of the product update ⊗ of (M,w) by (M′,w′).
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Theorem 17. Let φ, φ′′ ∈ L and φ′ ∈ L′. It holds that φ, φ′ φ′′ if and only if
φ ⊗ φ′ → φ′′ ∈ K.
As the above theorem shows, progression is an analogue in a dynamic setting of the
notion of prime implicate. In propositional logic, λ is a prime implicate of φ if φ ` λ
and for all λ′ such that φ ` λ′, if λ′ ` λ then λ ` λ′ (a similar notion has also been
defined in first-order logic and modal logic). Our operator ⊗ has also the same import
as the operator ⊗ of [Baltag et al., 2005], although it is used there in a different, i.e.
algebraic, setting. To prove Theorem 17, we first prove two lemmas:
Lemma 18. Let P′ be a finite subset of Φ′ and let P be a finite subset of Φ such that⋃{
P(Pre(p′))
∣∣∣∣∣ p′ ∈ P′} ⊆ P. Let n ∈ N and N = max{deg(Pre(p′)) ∣∣∣∣∣ p′ ∈ P′}. Let
δ ∈ S Pn+N and δ′ ∈ S P
′
n . Let (M,w) be a pointed L-model and (M′,w′) be a pointed L′-
model such that M,w |= Pre(w′), M,w |= δ and M′,w′ |= δ′. Then (M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′) |=
δ ⊗ δ′.
Proof. By induction on n.
n=0. By Proposition 7, (M,w)←(M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′). So (M,w)←N(M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′).
Then (M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′) |= δ′′N for some δ′′N ∈ Re f (δN) by Proposition 8. So, by
definition of δ ⊗ δ′, (M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′) |= δ ⊗ δ′.
n+1. Assume that M,w |= δ and M′,w′ |= δ′ for some δ ∈ S Pn+1+N and δ′ ∈ S P
′
n+1.
δ = δ0 ∧
∧
j∈Agt
 ∧
δ j∈R j(δ)
〈B j〉δn ∧ B j
 ∨
δ j∈R j(δ)
δn+N

 ,
δ′ = δ′0 ∧
∧
j∈Agt
 ∧
δ′j∈R j(δ′)
〈B j〉δ′j ∧ B j
 ∨
δ′j∈R j(δ′)
δ′j

 .
Let (M′′, (w,w′)) = (M,w)⊗(M′,w′) and (v, v′) ∈ R j(w,w′). Then v ∈ R j(w), v′ ∈
R j(w′) and M, v |= Pre(v′). Then, M, v |= δ j for some δ j ∈ R j(δ), M′, v′ |= δ′j
for some δ′j ∈ R j(δ′) and δ j → Pre(δ′j) ∈ K. Then, by induction hypothesis,
M′′, (v, v′) |= δ j ⊗ δ′j.
Reciprocally, for all δ j ∈ R j(δ) and δ′j ∈ R j(δ′) such that δ j → Pre(δ′j) ∈ K,
there is (v, v′) ∈ R j(w,w′) such that M, v |= δ j, M′, v′ |= δ′j, and therefore also
M′′, (v, v′) |= δ j ⊗ δ′j by induction hypothesis. So:
(M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′) |= δ0 ∧
∧
j∈Agt
(∧{
〈B j〉(δ j ⊗ δ′j)
∣∣∣∣∣ (δ j, δ′j) ∈ R j(δ) ⊗ R j(δ′)}
∧B j
(∨{
δ j ⊗ δ′j
∣∣∣∣∣ (δ j, δ′j) ∈ R j(δ) ⊗ R j(δ′)}) )
i.e. (M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′) |= δ ⊗ δ′.
Lemma 19. Let n ∈ N, let P′ be a finite subset of Φ′ and let P be a finite subset of
Φ such that
⋃{
P(Pre(p′))
∣∣∣∣∣ p′ ∈ P′} ⊆ P. Let δ ∈ S Pn+N and δ′ ∈ S P′n such that
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δ → Pre(δ′) ∈ K. Let (M′′,w′′) be a finite and pointed L-model. If M′′,w′′ |= δ ⊗ δ′,
then there is a pointed L-model (M,w) and a pointed L′-model (M′,w′) such that
(M′′,w′′)↔(M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′), M,w |= δ and M′,w′ |= δ′.
Proof. By induction on n.
n = 0. Let (M′′,w′′) be a finite pointed L-model and assume that M′′,w′′ |= δ ⊗ δ′ for
some δ ∈ S PN and δ′ ∈ S P
′
0 . Then, M
′′,w′′ |=
∨
δ′′∈Re f (δ)
δ′′ by definition of δ ⊗ δ′.
Let (M,w) be a finite and pointed L-model such that the modal structure of
(M,w) from depth N on is the same as (M′′,w′′) and such that M,w |= δ. Then
M,w←M′′,w′′. So, by Proposition 7, there is (M′,w′) a pointed L′-model such
that (M′′,w′′) = (M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′). Moreover, M′,w′ |= δ′ because deg(δ′) = 0.
n + 1. Let (M′′,w′′) be a pointedL-model such that M′′,w′′ |= δ⊗δ′ for some δ ∈ S Pn+N
and δ′ ∈ S P′n . Then, for all v′′ ∈ R j(w′′), there are (δ j, δ′j) ∈ R j(δ) ⊗ R j(δ′) such
that M′′, v′′ |= δ j ⊗ δ′j. Consequently, by induction hypothesis, for all v′′ ∈
R j(w′′), there are a finite and pointed L-model (M j,v′′ , v j,v′′ ) and a pointed L′-
model (M′j,v′′ , v
′
j,v′′ ) such that (M
′′, v′′) = (M j,v′′ , v j,v′′ ) ⊗ (M′j,v′′ , v′j,v′′ ), M, v |= δ j
and M′, v′ |= δ′j.
We then build a L-model (M,w) by introducing a new world w with valuation δ0
(the atomic facts not in P are set to false in this possible world) and by linking
this world w to the pointed L-model (M j,v′′ , v j,v′′ ) by an accessibility relation
indexed by j, and so for all v′′ ∈ R j(w′′) and all j ∈ Agt. We also link world w to
pointedL-models (Mδ j ,wδ j ) such that Mδ j ,wδ j |= δ j, and so for the remaining δ js
in R j(δ). We build similarly a L′-model (M′,w′) by introducing a new possible
event w′ with valuation δ′0 (the atomic events not in P
′ are set to false in this
possible event) and by linking this new possible event w′ to the pointedL′-model
(M′j,v′′ , v
′
j,v′′ ) by an accessibility relation indexed by j, and so for all v
′′ ∈ R j(w′′)
and all j ∈ Agt. We also link world w′ to pointed L′-models (M′δ j ,w′δ′j ) such that
M′δ j ,w
′
δ′j
|= δ′j, and so for the remaining δ′js in R j(δ′). One can then easily show
that (M′′,w′′)↔(M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′), M,w |= δ and M′,w′ |= δ′.
We can now prove Theorem 17:
Proof (of Theorem 17). We first prove that for all n ∈ N, all δ ∈ S Pn and all δ′ ∈ S P
′
n ,
we have that δ ⊗ δ′ → φ′′ ∈ K iff δ, δ′ φ′′.
• Assume that δ ⊗ δ′ → φ′′ ∈ K. Let (M,w) be a pointed L-model and (M′,w′)
be a pointed L-model such that M,w |= Pre(w′), M,w |= δ and M′,w′ |= δ′.
Then, by Lemma 18, (M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′) |= δ ⊗ δ′. So (M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′) |= φ′′ by
assumption. Then, δ, δ′ φ′′.
• Assume that δ, δ′ φ′′. If δ ⊗ δ′ is K-inconsistent, then the result trivially holds.
Otherwise, let (M′′,w′′) be a finiteL-model such that M′′,w′′ |= δ⊗δ′. Note that
because K has the finite model property with respect to the class of L-models,
such a model exists. Then, by Lemma 19, there is a pointed L-model (M,w)
and a pointed L′-model (M′,w′) such that (M′′,w′′)↔(M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′) and
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M,w |= δ, M′,w′ |= δ′. So M′′,w′′ |= φ′′ by assumption. Therefore, for all
finite L-model M, it holds that M |= δ⊗ δ→ φ′′. Hence, because K has the finite
model property with respect to the class of L-models, δ ⊗ δ→ φ′′ ∈ K.
Let φ, φ′′ ∈ L and φ′ ∈ L′. Let n = max {deg(φ), deg(φ′)} and N = max {Pre(p′) ∣∣∣∣∣ p′ ∈ P′}.
Then, by Corollaries 1 and 2, there are S ⊆ S Pn+N and S ′ ⊆ S P
′
n such that φ↔
∨
δ∈S
δ ∈ K
and φ′ ↔
∨
δ′∈S ′
δ′ ∈ K′. Therefore, φ, φ′ φ′′
iff
∨
δ∈S
δ,
∨
δ′∈S ′
δ′ φ′′ by rule R9 and R10
iff for all δ ∈ S , all δ′ ∈ S ′, we have that δ, δ′ φ′′ by rules R7 and R8
iff for all δ ∈ S , all δ′ ∈ S ′, we have that δ ⊗ δ′ → φ′′ ∈ K
iff
∨
δ∈S ,δ′∈S ′
δ ⊗ δ′ → φ′′ ∈ K
iff φ ⊗ φ′ → φ′′ ∈ K.
6 Extension of our results to other modal logics
In this section, we show how our results extend to other logics than K and K′, under the
condition that the class of models they define is stable for the product update.
Let C be a class of L-models and C′ be a class of L′-models. C is stable for the
product update with respect to the class C′ when for all M ∈ C and all M′ ∈ C′, for
all w ∈ M and all w′ ∈ M′ such that M,w |= Pre(w′), (M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′) is a pointed
L-model of C. As noted in [van Benthem, 2007], the only first-order frame conditions
that are stable for the product update are those definable as universal Horn sentences.
Reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity are of this special form.
Let C be a class of L-models and let C′ be a class of L′-models. The inference
relation φ, φ′ C,C′ φ
′′ is defined as follows:
φ, φ′ C,C′ φ
′′ iff for all pointed L-model (M,w) of C, and L′-model (M′,w′)
of C′ such that M,w |= Pre(w′), if M,w |= φ and M′,w′ |= φ′
then (M,w) ⊗ (M′,w′) |= φ′′
Let L be a logic for the language L containing the logic K and let L′ be a logic for
the language L′ containing the logic K′. The DEL-sequent calculus SCL,L′ is defined
as the DEL-sequent calculus SC, except that the logic K (resp. K′) is replaced by the
logic L (resp. L′). A DEL-sequent of SCL,L′ is written φ, φ
′
L,L′ φ
′′.
Theorem 20. Let L be a logic sound and complete for L with respect to a class C of
L-models and let L′ be a logic sound and complete for L′ with respect to a class C′ of
L′-models. If C is stable for the product update with respect to the class C′, then for
all φ, φ′′ ∈ L and all φ′ ∈ L′, it holds that φ, φ′ C,C′ φ′′ if and only if φ, φ′ L,L′ φ′′.
Proof. It can easily be adapted from the proofs of Theorems 9 and 14.
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7 Example
Let us take up our card game example of Section 3. We formalize the general setting
of the game in a logic L defined as follows:
Definition 18 (Logic L). The logic L is defined by adding to the logic K the following
axiom schemata, where j ranges over {A, B,C} and Card over {r,w, b}.
(Card Game CG1) ` Card j → ¬Cardi for all i , j
(Card Game CG2) ` r j ∨ b j ∨ w j
(Card Game CG3) ` Card j → B jCard j

Axioms CG1 and CG2 state that players A, B, C have a unique card. Axiom CG3
states that the players ‘know’ which card they have. Then we can derive in the DEL-
sequent calculus SCL,K′ the following statements. We recall that the atomic event p
′
stands for ‘player A shows her red card’.
>, B j p′ L,K′ B jrA (Inference 1) wB, BB p′ L,K′ BBbC (Inference 2)
Inference 1 states that player j believes that player A has the red card after any event
during which player j believed that player A showed her red card. Inference 2 states
that if player B has the white card, then after an event during which he believes that
player A shows her red card, he believes that player C has the blue card. We provide
below the proof of these two inferences.
rA,> L,K′ rA
A4
rA, p′ L,K′ rA
R9
¬Pre(p′), p′ L,K′ ⊥
A6
¬rA, p′ L,K′ rA
R9
>, p′ L,K′ rA
R8
B j>, B j p′ L,K′ B jrA
R4
>, B j p′ L,K′ B jrA
>→B j>∈K,R9
wB,> L,K′ wB
A4
wB, p′ L,K′ wB
R9
wB, p′ L,K′ ¬wC
CG1,R9
¬Pre(p′), p′ L,K′ ⊥
A6
¬rA, p′ L,K′ rA
R9
¬rA, p′ L,K′ ¬rC
CG1,R9
wB, p′ L,K′ ¬rC
CG1,R9
wB, p′ L,K′ ¬wC ∧ ¬rC
R6
wB, p′ L,K′ bC
CG2,R9
BBwB, BB p′ L,K′ BBbC
R4
wB, BB p′ L,K′ BBbC
CG3,R9
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8 Concluding remarks
Even if our axiomatizations provide a natural characterization of the standard BMS
product update, as we argued in the comments following Definition 15, it still re-
mains to show that our approach can be adapted to the analysis of other product up-
dates. If one considers product updates defined on the basis of a relational Kripke-
style semantics, as in this paper, one has to admit that few alternatives to the prod-
uct update of Definition 8 exist in the DEL literature ([Liu, 2008] mentions some
of them) and that eliciting a large family of new and meaningful product updates
seems at first sight difficult. On the other hand, if the logical framework presented
in this paper is enriched with more refined representations of uncertainty (by means
of plausibility or probability measures for instance), other kinds of product updates
can be studied, which address other kinds of dynamics, such as belief revision or non-
monotonic reasoning. As it turns out, numerous product update rules for belief re-
vision have been proposed in this richer setting [Aucher, 2004, van Ditmarsch, 2005,
Aucher, 2007, Baltag & Smets, 2006, Baltag & Smets, 2008, van Benthem, 2007, Liu, 2008,
van Benthem et al., 2009b]. Nevertheless, one still needs to show that the proof tech-
niques developped in this paper can be adapted to these more refined representations
of uncertainty.
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